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I.  INTRODUCTION 
“We needed a way to keep an eye on the American citizens without 
them knowing. It was imperative, for their own safety of course.” 
– President Richard Nixon (1978) 
Sheikh Yassir Fazaga, Ali Uddin Malik, and Yasser AbdelRahim 
resided in Southern California.1 They spent their days working, spending 
time with their families, and attending mosque.2 In 2006, although they 
did not know it at the time, nor could they, their lives changed when their 
daily activities began being surveilled by the Federal Bureau of 
Investigations (“FBI”) without their knowledge or consent.3 Under a 
dragnet surveillance program titled “Operation Flex,” the FBI targeted and 
surveilled hundreds of Muslims in the Orange County area to obtain as 
much information as possible.4 Fazaga, Malik, AbdelRahim represent a 
class of Muslims whose constitutional rights to freedom of religion and 
privacy were invaded for no reason other than their Muslim religion.5 
Unfortunately, in the wake of the tragic 9/11 attacks, their story and the 
substantial invasion of their rights is all too common for Muslims across 
America. The relationship between Muslim-Americans and law 
enforcement has been one of tension for several years, as law 
enforcement’s attempts to build trust with Muslim communities in order 
to rely on community members to provide essential information on 
terrorist activities are undermined by the invasion of  substantial rights of 
the very same Muslims they pretend to be in harmony with.6 These 
methods of depriving Muslims of constitutionally protected rights have 
 
1 First Amended Complaint at 21-25; Fazaga. v. Fed. Bureau of Investigation, 916 F.3d 
1202, 21-25 (9th Cir. 2019) (No. SA-CV-11-00301) [hereinafter First Amended 
Complaint]. 
2 Id. 
3 Id. at 15-18. 
4 Id. at 1-2, 27. 
5 Id. at 2. 
6 See generally Bryan Tau, What is FISA? The Surveillance Law Behind the Memo 
Explained, THE WALL STREET JOURNAL (Feb. 2, 2018); See Human Rights Institute, 
Illusions of Justice: Human Rights Abuses in US Terrorism Prosecutions, at 5 (July 2014). 
[hereinafter Illusions of Justice] (discussing Ahmed Omar Abu Ali, a US citizen, who was 
swept up in a mass arrest campaign in Saudi Arabia in 2003. Ali was whipped, denied food, 
and threatened with amputation before he succumbed to his interrogators and gave a false 
confession. At his trial in the United States, the judge ignored his claims of torture and 
admitted his confession into evidence. He was convicted and is serving a life sentence in 
solitary confinement in a supermax prison in Colorado). 
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been numerous and far-reaching, ranging from the use of evidence 
obtained by coercion7 to inhumane detention conditions.8 Since the attacks 
of 9/11, the use of electronic surveillance in particular has been more 
frequent, and nearly every branch of government has relaxed the 
conditions of using electronic surveillance to spy on those suspected of 
terrorism activities.9 
This note uses the Ninth Circuit’s decision in Fazaga v. FBI to 
illustrate how the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (“FISA”) can be 
used as a tool to the benefit of, rather than merely to the detriment of, 
Muslims in America in order to protect their constitutional right to be free 
of invasions of privacy on the basis of their religion. Part II of this note 
discusses the history of the FISA, from the historically documented 
executive abuse of suspicionless electronic surveillance, to the creation 
and operation of FISA. Part III examines the history of the state secrets 
privilege, often used as a cloak for the governments unconstitutional and 
abusive investigation tactics under the guise of national security. Part IV 
of this note summarizes the facts and shocking details of the case, Fazaga 
v. FBI, paying particular attention to the egregious manner in which the 
FBI’s undercover informant intruded on the privacy of Muslim 
individuals. Part V provides an in-depth analysis of the Ninth Circuit’s 
holding in Fazaga v. FBI. Part V.A analyzes the Ninth Circuit’s decision 
with regard to the substantive FISA claims, noting the court correctly 
applied the reasonable expectation of privacy test to Fazaga’s claims. 
Finally, Part V.B argues the Ninth Circuit’s holding that FISA displaces 
the state secrets privilege and thus plaintiff’s claims could proceed under 
the procedures set forth in FISA without offending constitutional 
principles of separation of powers. 
 
7 See Illusions of Justice, supra note 6, at 7 (discussing Ahmed Omar Abu Ali, a US 
citizen, who was swept up in a mass arrest campaign in Saudi Arabia in 2003. Ali was 
whipped, denied food, and threatened with amputation before he succumbed to his 
interrogators and gave a false confession. At his trial in the United States, the judge ignored 
his claims of torture and admitted his confession into evidence. He was convicted and is 
serving a life sentence in solitary confinement in a supermax prison in Colorado). 
8 Id. at 7 (discussing Uzair Paracha, who was held in solitary confinement for almost 
two years before he was convicted on material support to terrorist activities charges. Nine 
months after he was convicted, he spent another 9 months in solitary, unable to say 
anything to anyone except the security guards, largely begging them to turn the lights off 
or ask for basic necessities). 
9 Id. at 59. 
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II. THE FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE ACT 
“Americans fought a revolution in part over the right to be free 
from unreasonable searches – to ensure that our government 
could not come knocking in the middle of the night for no reason. 
We need to find a way forward to make sure we can stop terrorists 
with protecting the privacy and liberty of innocent Americans.” – 
Barack Obama (2006) 
a. Pre-FISA: The Judicial Response to Electronic 
Surveillance 
The Supreme Court first addressed the federal government’s use of 
warrantless electronic surveillance in Olmstead v. United States,10 in 
which it held electronic surveillance through wiretapping does not require 
a warrant under the Fourth Amendment because such activity does not 
amount to a search or seizure within the Fourth Amendment.11 However, 
years later in Katz v. United States,12 the Supreme Court changed positions 
and held that because “the Fourth Amendment protects people, not 
places,”13 the wiretapping of a phone booth constitutes a search and seizure 
within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment, and is therefore subject to 
the Fourth Amendment’s warrant requirement.14 Since then, the Court has 
implemented a “reasonable expectation of privacy” test pronounced in 
Justice Harlan’s concurring opinion in Katz to evaluate Fourth 
Amendment violations.15 Katz, however, was a domestic case involving 
electronic surveillance in the pursuit of criminal prosecution, the Supreme 
Court did not decide whether the executive may conduct warrantless 
electronic surveillance for the purpose of national security.16 
The Supreme Court addressed the executive’s constitutional authority 
to conduct warrantless electronic surveillance of domestic threats to 
 
10 Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438 (1928), overruled by Katz v. United States, 
389 U.S. 347 (1967). 
11 Id. at 466. 
12 Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967). 
13 Id. at 351. 
14 Id. at 359. 
15 Id. at 360-61; See also Scott J. Glick, FISA’s Significant Purpose Requirement and 
the Government’s Ability to Protect National Security, 1 HARVARD NAT’L SECURITY L. 
REV., 87, 94 (May 30, 2010). 
16 Katz, 389 U.S. at 358 n.23 (“Whether safeguards other than prior authorization by a 
magistrate would satisfy the Fourth Amendment in a situation involving the national 
security is a question not presented by this case.”) 
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national security in United States vs. United States District Court (Keith).17 
In Keith, the defendant planted an overnight bomb meant to destroy the 
property of a local C.I.A. office in protest to the C.I.A. presence in Ann 
Arbor, Michigan.18 The defendant attempted to compel the government to 
produce evidence pertaining to information gathered by electronic 
surveillance.19 The government refused to disclose the surveillance 
evidence, claiming the surveillance was a reasonable exercise of the 
president’s inherent authority to protect national security, and that 
disclosure would threaten national security.20 The Court, while 
recognizing the president’s duty to protect the nation from threats to 
national security, nonetheless held that the Fourth Amendment requires 
the president to obtain a warrant before engaging in electronic surveillance 
for domestic security purposes.21 
While the Court in Keith limited it’s ruling to domestic surveillance, 
expressly reserving the question of the president’s authority in cases of 
foreign powers or their agents,22 the decision was highly suggestive as to 
Congress’s powers to proscribe procedures for national security 
surveillance that comply with the Fourth Amendment.23 Significantly, the 
Court acknowledged that in the case of intelligence gathering, 
[d]ifferent standards may be compatible with the Fourth Amendment 
if they are reasonable both in relation to the legitimate need of government 
for intelligence information and the protected rights of our citizens. For 
the warrant application may vary according to the governmental interest 
to be enforced and the nature of the citizen rights deserving protection.24 
Keith was significant in both recognizing Congress’s authority to 
enact specific procedures for intelligence gathering, and also noting that 
the procedures proscribed may very well differ from the standards set by 
the Fourth Amendment when the pursuit is intelligence gathering.25 Keith 
 
17 United States v. U.S. Dist. Court (Keith), 407 U.S. 297, 314-22 (1972). The case is 
known as the Keith case because it arose out of a writ of mandamus against the Honorable 
Judge Damon Keith, United States District Court Judge, who ordered the government to 
disclose wiretapping information. 
18 Id. at 299. 
19 Id. at 299-300. 
20 Id. at 301. 
21 Id. at 320-22. (“We recognize, as we have before, the constitutional basis of the 
President’s domestic security role, but we think it must be exercised in a manner 
compatible with the Fourth Amendment.”) 
22 Id. at 321-22. 
23 Id. at 322. 
24 Id. at 322-23. 
25 See Nicholos J. Whilt, The Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act: Protecting Civil 
Liberties That Make Defense of Our Nation Worthwhile, 35 SW. U. L. REV. 361, 366 
(2006). 
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created a circuit split among courts that accepted an implicit exception to 
the warrant requirement where the national security threat was a foreign 
power, and others that would not recognize an exception for foreign 
security threats.26 Subsequent historical events involving the executive 
branch’s abuse of power in the name of national security compelled 
Congress to heed the Supreme Court’s advice in Keith and legislate in the 
field of intelligence gathering.27 
b. FISA: The Legislative Response to Executive Abuse 
It is 1973 in Washington D.C., the political parties have set aside their 
differences and all three branches of government have banded together as 
a result of one of the most salient and atrocious abuses of power America 
has suffered in recent history: Watergate.28 American Presidents have 
historically claimed the ability to conduct warrantless national security 
surveillance as ancillary to their duty to protect from national security 
threats.29 The other branches held the belief that the executive branch was 
overreaching its constitutionally granted powers, and infringing on civil 
liberties in the process.30 
This tension came to a head when President Nixon’s scandalous use 
of electronic surveillance to spy on his political party opponents became 
public.31 The legislature soon realized that Nixon used the guise of national 
security to justify illegally spying on those lawfully engaged in political 
dissent.32 In response to President Nixon’s abuse of warrantless electronic 
surveillance, an investigation was launched, known as the “Church 
Committee” to discover what other abuses had occurred as a result of 
unchecked executive power under the guise of national security.33 
The Church Committee uncovered a startling history of government 
exploiting electronic surveillance since the 1930s, the targets of which 
ranged from Congressmen, White House advisors, anti-war protest 
groups, and others who posed no actual threat to national security.34 The 
 
26 See Robert A. Dawson, Shifting the Balance: The D.C. Circuit and the Foreign 
Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978, 61 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1380, 1385 (June 1993). 
27 Id. at 1385-88. 
28 Carl Bernstein & Bob Woodward, FBI Finds Nixon Aides Sabotaged Democrats, 
WASH. POST (Oct. 10, 1972), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/national/longterm/
watergate/articles/101072-1.htm. 
29 See Dawson, supra note 26, at 1382. 
30 Id. 
31 Elizabeth Goitein and Faiza Patel, What Went Wrong With The FISA Court, 14, 
BRENNAN CENTER FOR JUSTICE, (2015). 
32 Dawson, supra note 26, at 1386. 
33 See Whilt, supra note 25, at 385. 
34 Id.; see also S. REP. NO. 95-604, at 7, (noting that while a number of illegal or 
improper national security taps and bugs conducted during the Nixon administration may 
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two-year long investigation by the Church Committee revealed that 
President Eisenhower authorized the FBI to conduct domestic electronic 
surveillance on political opponents, including Martin Luther King Jr.’s 
Southern Christian Leadership Conference.35 The Church Committee 
found that every executive since Franklin. D. Roosevelt had claimed the 
power to authorize warrantless electronic surveillance and abused that 
power.36 Congress became especially concerned with the potential stifling 
of constitutionally protected speech in the form of political dissent.37 The 
unsettling discovery of executive abuse motivated the executive branch 
and Congress to create legislation that would safeguard against 
overreaching executive power in the form of warrantless electronic 
surveillance.38 In 1978, as a reaction to the Church Committee’s 
discoveries, Congress enacted FISA.39 
 
have exceeded those in previous administrations, the surveillance was regrettably by no 
means atypical). 
35 Goitein & Patel, supra note 31, at 13. 
36 See STAFF OF S. COMM. ON INTELLIGENCE AND THE RIGHTS OF AMERICAS, 95TH CONG., 
FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE ACT OF 1978 (Comm. Print 1978). [hereinafter 
SENATE JUDICIARY REPORT]. 
37 Id. at 3909-10. (“Also formidable-although incalculable-is the ‘chilling effect’ which 
warrantless electronic surveillance may have on the constitutional rights of those who were 
not targets of the surveillance, but who perceived themselves, whether reasonably or 
unreasonably, as potential targets. Our Bill of Rights is concerned not only with direct 
infringements on constitutional rights, but also with government activities which 
effectively inhibit the exercise of these rights. The exercise of political freedom depends 
in large measure on citizens’ understanding that they will be able to be publicly active and 
dissent from official policy, within lawful limits, without having to sacrifice the 
expectation of privacy that they rightfully hold. Arbitrary or uncontrolled use of 
warrantless electronic surveillance can violate that understanding and impair that public 
confidence so necessary to an uninhibited political life.”) 
38 Goitein & Patel, supra note 31, at 14. 
39 See Dawson, supra note 26, at 1386. See also SENATE JUDICIARY REPORT, supra note 
36, at 3908 (“the need for such statutory safeguards has become apparent in recent years. 
This legislation is in large measure a response to the revelations that warrantless electronic 
surveillance in the nation of national security has been seriously abused.”). 
84 UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI RACE & SOCIAL JUSTICE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 11:76 
 
c. FISA in Operation: Legislative Structure and Protections 
i. Procedural Safeguards 
FISA establishes a statuary procedure that allows the government to 
conduct electronic surveillance40 by first obtaining judicial approval.41 
FISA mandates that before a government agency conducts electronic 
surveillance, the government agency must obtain a particular warrant 
(“FISA warrant”) by a special tribunal body, the Foreign Intelligence 
Surveillance Court (“FISC”).42 First, the government files a detailed 
application to FISC requesting authorization for electronic surveillance of 
a facility or place.43 The application must contain a sworn statement by a 
federal officer and be approved by the attorney general.44 The application 
must also include “the identity or description of the target of surveillance,45 
a statement of facts that justify the belief that the target is an agent of a 
foreign power,46 a statement of the proposed minimization procedures,47 a 
description of the “nature of the information sought and the type of 
communications or activities to be subjected to the surveillance,”48 and a 
certification that the purpose of the surveillance is to obtain foreign 
intelligence information that cannot “reasonably be obtained by normal 
investigative techniques,”49 among other things. 
The FISC must then find that the application does indeed contain the 
above requirements,50 and enter an order describing the identity of the 
 
40 See 50 U.S.C. § 1801(f). FISA defines electronic surveillance under four categories; 
(1) acquisition of wire or radio communications that intentionally targets a particular 
known United States person who is in the United States; (2) acquisition of wire 
communication to or from a person in the united states, without consent of any party, if the 
acquisition occurs in the united states; (3) the intentional acquisition of radio 
communication if both the sender and recipients are in the United States; and (4) the 
installation of electronic, mechanical, or other surveillance device in the United States 
other than from a wire or radio. 
41 See Dawson, supra note 26, at 1389. 
42 See Glick, supra note 15, at 93. 
43 See Director of National Intelligence, The FISA Amendments Act: Q&A 1 (Apr. 18, 
2017), https://www.dni.gov/files/icotr/FISA%20Amendments%20Act%20QA%20for%
20Publication.pdf. 
44 50 U.S.C. § 1804(a) (“Each application for an order approving electronic surveillance 
under this chapter shall be made by a Federal officer in writing upon oath or affirmation to 
a [FISA court] judge. Each application shall require the approval of the Attorney General 
based upon his finding that it satisfies the criteria and requirements of such application as 
set forth in this chapter.”) 
45 50 U.S.C. § 1804(a)(2). 
46 50 U.S.C. § 1804(a)(3). 
47 50 U.S.C. § 1804(a)(4). 
48 50 U.S.C. § 1804(a)(5). 
49 50 U.S.C. § 1804(a)(6). 
50 50 U.S.C. § 1805(a). 
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target, the nature and location of the sites where the surveillance is to be 
conducted, the type of information sought, the means to be employed, and 
the period of time for which the surveillance is approved.51 Importantly, 
for the application to be approved, the government must show probable 
cause to believe the target is a foreign power or agent of a foreign power, 
and that the facility or place to be surveilled is used or  about to be used 
by the target.52 By requiring the government to elaborate their suspicions 
with specific details, FISA places strict limits on the executive’s ability to 
conduct electronic surveillance in an effort to suppress lawful political 
dissent.53 
Congress also built in a course of redress whenever electronic 
surveillance for the purpose of intelligence gathering is conducted without 
a FISA warrant.54 FISA provides that a person who “engages in electronic 
surveillance under color of law except as authorized by [FISA, the Wiretap 
Act, the Stored Communications Act, or the pen register statute] or any 
express statutory authorization” is guilty of a criminal offense.55 FISA also 
provides for a private right of action for an aggrieved person56 who has 
been subjected to surveillance against the person who committed the 
surveillance.57 Finally, and most significantly for this note, FISA allows 
for in camera and ex parte review by a district court of “the application, 
order or other materials relation to the surveillance as may be necessary to 
determine whether the surveillance of the aggrieved person was lawfully 
authorized and conducted” under statutorily defined circumstances.58 
ii. Constitutional Protections 
The purpose of FISA was to strike a balance in which the executive 
branch could conduct legitimate foreign intelligence surveillance without 
abridging the right to individual privacy and civil liberties guaranteed by 
the constitution.59 FISA warrants, while providing significantly 
 
51 50 U.S.C. § 1804(c)(1) 
52 50 U.S.C. § 1805(a)(4). 
53 Goitein & Patel, supra note 31, at 14. 
54 See infra notes 55-58 and accompanying text. 
55 50 U.S.C. § 1809(a). 
56 50 U.S.C. § 1801(k) (defining “Aggrieved person” as “a person who is the target of 
an electronic surveillance or any other person whose communications or activities were 
subject to electronic surveillance.”). 
57 50 U.S.C. § 1810 (providing “an aggrieved person . . . who has been subjected to an 
electronic surveillance or about whom information obtained by electronic surveillance of 
such person has been disclosed or used in violation of section 1809 of this title shall have 
a cause of action against any person who committed such violation.”) 
58 50 U.S.C. § 1806(f). 
59 See Dawson, supra note 26, at 1386-87. 
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diminished protections than traditional law enforcement warrants,60 are 
imperative to retaining any meaningful First and Fourth Amendment 
rights. This is because in times of national security crises, the government 
looks most suspiciously to those who exercise their First Amendment 
rights to political speech and exercise of religion.61 The Supreme Court 
noted in Keith that national security cases reveal an extraordinary merging 
of First and Fourth Amendment rights because although “the investigative 
duty of the executive may be stronger in such cases, so also is there greater 
jeopardy to constitutionally protected speech.”62 
Indeed, there is a history of the federal government sacrificing 
individual liberties in the name of national security whenever they 
perceive a “threat” among a particular group.63 In the post-9/11 era, the 
focus has shifted to Muslim Americans exercising their constitutionally 
protected freedom of religion guaranteed by the First Amendment.64 For 
example, the FBI has expended considerable energy on creating 
demographic profiles to map the racial, ethnic and religious make up of  
communities in order to pin point their investigative sights.65 After 
targeting these groups solely based on unconstitutional religious 
profiling,66 the FBI infiltrates Muslim communities by sending undercover 
informants, often posed as newcomers seeking guidance, to covertly 
gather as much information as possible by attending mosques and 
community events.67 
The Supreme Court has recognized that the Fourth Amendment’s 
protections of private communications are necessary to exercising First 
Amendment freedoms of speech and association.68 In enacting FISA, 
Congress intended to prevent the government from unjustifiably intruding 
upon the privacy of individuals by providing a means for the government 
to obtain a warrant based on probable cause before conducting 
 
60 For a comparison of protections and procedures offered by Title III warrants and FISA 
warrants, see Whilt, supra note 25. 
61 See Robert M. Chesney, Civil Liberties and the Terrorism Prevention Paradigm: The 
Guilty By Association Critique, 101 MICHIGAN L. REV. 1408, 1418 (2003). 
62 United States v. U.S. Dist. Court (Keith), 407 U.S. 297, 313-14 (1972). 
63 See Chesney, supra note 61, at 1412 (describing the historical cycle of civil liberties 
abuse during past times of national security crises). 
64 See Illusions of Justice, supra note 7, at 18. 
65 Id. 
66 American Civil Liberties Union, ACLU EYE on the FBI: The FBI is Engaged in 
Unconstitutional Racial Profiling and Racial Mapping (Oct. 20, 2011), 
https://www.aclu.org/files/assets/aclu_eye_on_the_fbi_alert_- 
_fbi_engaged_in_unconstitutional_racial_profiling_and_racial_mapping_0.pdf. 
67 See Illusions of Justice, supra note 7, at 18-19. 
68 United States v. U.S. Dist. Court (Keith), 407 U.S. 297, 313-14 (1972). 
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surveillance for intelligence gathering purposes.69 Thus, by allowing the 
government to invade the privacy of those the federal government deems 
to be a “threat,” without a FISA warrant supported by probable cause, we 
risk chilling the freedom of speech that distinguishes American society 
from an Orwellian state.70 
III. STATE SECRETS 
“We’d do well to remember that at the end of the day, the law 
doesn’t defend us; we defend the law. And when it becomes 
contrary to our morals, we have both the right and the 
responsibility to rebalance it toward just ends.” – Edward 
Snowden 
Where plaintiffs attempt to bring a civil suit on the grounds that they 
believe they have been warrantlessly surveilled, the government often 
attempts to bar the suit on the grounds of state secrets privilege.71 The state 
secrets privilege is a common law evidentiary privilege that allows the 
government to prevent discovery of information containing state or 
military secrets on the basis disclosing such information poses a threat to 
national security. 72 The privilege can only be invoked by the head of an 
executive branch agency with the authority to sign a sworn affidavit 
confirming that he or she has personally reviewed the relevant information 
and determined it contains state secrets.73 The state secrets privilege has a 
long history of invocation,74 but the government’s assertion of the 
privilege in the post 9/11 era in response to claims of Fourth and First 
 
69 See SENATE JUDICIARY REPORT, supra note 36, at 3908. 
70 See Dawson, supra note 26, at 1394. 
71 Goitein & Patel, supra note 31, at 47; see also Laura K. Donohue, Shadow of States 
Secrets, 159 UNIV. PENN. L. REV. 77, 78 (2010). 
72 Stephanie A. Fichera, Compromising Liberty for National Security: The Need to Rein 
in the Executive’s Use of the State Secrets Privilege in Post–September 11 Litigation, 62 
U. MIAMI L. REV. 625, 628 (2008). 
73 See Reynolds v. United States, 345 U.S. 1, 7-8 (1953). 
74 There is some ongoing debate on whether the frequency of the privilege has spiked in 
the post 9/11 era. Compare Robert M. Chesney, States Secrets and the Limits of National 
Security Litigation, 75 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1249, 1301 (2007) (contending that the state 
secrets privilege has been invoked with uniform frequency among presidents) with Louis 
Fisher, In the Name of National Security: Unchecked Presidential Power and the Reynolds 
case 212, 245 (2006) (arguing that the state secrets privilege is unnecessary, contrary to 
individual liberties and due process, and supportive of executive abuse of power, asserts 
that the privilege is being asserted with greater frequency in the post 9/11 era). 
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Amendment constitutional violations has led to increasingly unchecked 
executive power and violations of civil liberties.75 
The state secrets privilege has origins in the Supreme Court’s 1875 
decision in Totten v. United States.76 In Totten, a Union spy claimed to be 
in contract with President Lincoln, who told him to travel behind enemy 
lines and relay information about the Confederate Army in return for $200  
per month.77 The Court held that it did not have the authority to enforce 
the contract because the lawsuit would “inevitably lead to the disclosure 
of matters which the law itself regards as confidential.”78 The very subject 
matter of the suit, the Court explained, would risk disclosure of “the details 
of dealing with individuals and officers  . . .  to the serious detriment of the 
public,” and therefore the Court dismissed the case.79 
The modern-day state secrets privilege was first announced by the 
Supreme Court in Reynolds v. United States.80 In Reynolds, the widows of 
three men killed in an Air Force B-29 plane crash brought a suit against 
the United States under the Federal Tort Claims Act.81 The plaintiffs 
sought production of the Air Force’s official investigation report and 
statements of surviving crew members made during the investigation.82 
The Secretary of the Air Force refused to produce the documents, filing a 
formal claim of state secrets privilege on the grounds that production of 
the documents would “seriously hamper[ ] national security, flying safety, 
and the development of highly technical and secret military equipment.”83 
The Supreme Court accepted the Government’s claim and held that where 
there is a formal claim of privilege invoked by the head of an executive 
department and an indication of a “reasonable possibility that military 
secrets were involved,” the state secrets privilege may bar disclosure of 
evidentiary materials.84 The Court stated that it would be up to the 
presiding court to determine whether to examine the evidence in question, 
 
75 Amanda Frost, The State Secrets Privilege and Separation of Powers, 75 FORDHAM 
L. REV. 1931, 1938 (2007) (“For over two decades following Reynolds, the executive 
rarely asserted the state secrets privilege . . . .But starting in 1977, the executive raised the 
privilege with greater frequency”); See also H. R. NO. 110-442, at 8 (“[the current] 
administration has raised the state secrets privilege in over 25 [percent] more cases per year 
than previous administrations and sought dismissal in over 90 [percent] more cases.”) 
(citing to 154 Cong. Rec. S198 (daily ed. Jan. 23, 2008) (statement of Sen. Kennedy)). 
76 Totten v. United States, 92 U.S. 105 (1875). 
77 Id. at 106. 
78 Id. at 107. 
79 Id. at 106-107. 
80 Reynolds v. United States, 345 U.S. 1 (1953). 
81 Id. at 2-3. 
82 Id. at 3; Without the investigation report, the plaintiffs could not establish a prima 
facie case of negligence, thereby warranting dismissal. See Donohue, supra note 71, at 82. 
83 Reynolds, 345 U.S. at 5. 
84 Id. at 4-5, 10-11. 
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but forewarned that where there is a danger that evidence will expose 
matters of national security that should not be disclosed, the court should 
not “jeopardize the security which the privilege is meant to protect by 
insisting upon an examination,” even in camera.85 
The executive branch may cite the above two seminal cases in support 
of a claim of state secrets privilege.86 The Totten Bar applies where the 
subject matter of the action itself is a state secret.87 The Totten Bar acts as 
a complete bar on adjudication of claims centered on state secrets.88 In 
contrast, the Reynolds privilege is an evidentiary tool that acts to remove 
the privileged evidence from litigation, and only where the state secrets 
are so interwoven with the case that it cannot be litigated without risk of 
disclosure is dismissal the proper remedy.89 Courts have found dismissal 
under Reynolds appropriate in only three circumstances: (1) where the 
plaintiff cannot prove their prima facie elements of the claim without the 
privileged evidence; (2) where the privilege deprives the defendant of 
information needed to put forth a valid defense; and (3) where the 
privileged evidence is so inextricable with nonprivileged information that 
is essential to the claims or defenses and litigating a case on its merits 
would impermissibly risk disclosing state secrets.90 Despite the clear 
difference in how the Totten bar and Reynolds privilege operate to dismiss 
a case implicating state secrets, the government has practiced moving for 
outright dismissal of complaints rather than just preclusion of discovery 
materials since the 1970s.91 
IV. FAZAGA V. FBI 
In July 2006, Craig Monteilh began his work as a paid FBI informant 
targeting the Muslim community in an effort to covertly gather 
information about Muslims in the Irvine, California area.92 In an effort to 
earn the trust of the Muslim community, Monteilh began attending the 
Islamic Center of Irvine (“ICOI”).93 Following instructions from his FBI 
 
85 Id. at 10. 
86 Fazaga. v. Federal Bureau of Investigation, 916 F.3d 1202, 1226-28 (9th Cir. 2019) 
(noting the two instances in which state secrets may apply). 
87 Id. at 1227. 
88 Id. 
89 Id. 
90 Id. (citing Mohamed v. Jeppesen Dataplan Inc., 614 F3d 1070, 1083 (9th Cir. 2010) 
(en banc)). 
91 Id. at 1227. 
92 First Amended Complaint, supra note 1, at 18. 
93 Id. 
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supervisors, he approached an imam,94 told a fabricated story of his French 
and Syrian decent and his desire to fully embrace his roots by formally 
converting to Islam, and from that point forward became entirely 
immersed in his role as a Muslim convert.95 Monteilh was provided with 
surveillance tools, including audio and video recording devices, and was 
instructed to perform specific spying tasks.96 These tasks included 
attending certain meetings and entering the houses of specific people, in 
order to “gather information on Muslims.”97 The FBI agents supervising 
Monteilh made it clear that the FBI had no single target, but instead were 
interested in the Muslim community as a whole, stating they wanted to 
“get as many files on this community as possible.”98 
Over the course of about fourteen months, Monteilh did as instructed 
by his FBI supervisors to gain the trust of the Muslim community in 
Orange County.99 Monteilh attended classes at the mosque, collected 
information on Muslim community members’ travel plans, attended daily 
prayers, exercised with targeted people to build a relationship, visited 
targeted houses and made lunch plans with specified Muslim 
individuals.100 Virtually all of Montiehl’s interactions with the Muslim 
community were recorded with audio and video recording devices, 
including a cell phone, two key fobs with audio recording capabilities, and 
a camera disguised as a button on his shirt.101 Monteilh’s recordings 
included audio from at least eight mosques, video of the layout of various 
mosques and homes, and most egregiously, conversations and meetings in 
the mosque prayer hall to which he was not a party to.102 An electronic 
device was installed in Fazaga’s office and other parts of his mosque not 
open to the public in order to record these conversations.103 
Ironically, Operation Flex began to unravel when Monteilh was 
instructed by his FBI supervisors to press Muslims in the community about 
jihad and armed conflict. He was told to indicate his readiness to engage 
in violence, and state he believed it was his “duty as a Muslim to take 
violent actions” and that he had access to weapons.104 Several ICOI 
members took these statements and reported them and Monteilh to 
 
94 An Imam is the prayer leader of a mosque. MERRIAM WEBSTER DICTIONARY, 
https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/imam. 
95 Fazaga, 916 F.3d at 1212-13. 
96 Id. 
97 Id. 
98 Id. at 1212. 
99 Id. at 1213. 
100 Id. at 1212-13. 
101 Id. at 1213. 
102 Id. 
103 Id. 
104 Id. at 1213-14. 
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community leaders, who then reported Monteilh to the FBI.105 The IOCI 
obtained a restraining order against Monteilh in June 2007, around the 
same time the FBI discharged him from Operation Flex.106 The dragnet 
surveillance did not result in a single counterterrorism conviction—a 
predictable result considering the FBI targeted the Muslim community 
based solely on their religious practice and not on the basis of any 
suspected criminal activity.107 
In September 2011, Plaintiffs filed suit as a putative class action on 
behalf of “[a]ll individuals targeted by Defendant for surveillance or 
information-gathering through Monteilh and Operation Flex, on the 
account of their religion, and about whom the FBI gained personally 
identifiable information.”108 The complaint alleged eleven causes of 
action, which can be categorized as claims alleging unconstitutional 
searches in violation of the Fourth Amendment and claims alleging illegal 
discrimination on the basis of, or burdens on, or abridgement of religion 
in violation of the First Amendment.109 Plaintiffs sought injunctive relief, 
specifically an order for Defendants to destroy or return any information 
gathered by or derived from the unlawful surveillance program, as well as 
damages, for themselves and the class.110 The government moved to 
dismiss and for summary judgment on the grounds that the religion 
claims—but not the search claims—should be dismissed under the 
Reynolds state secrets privilege because litigation on those claims could 
not go forth without the threat of disclosure of evidence protected by state 
secrets.111 
The district court’s first order dismissed the FISA claim against the 
government, but not the agent Defendants, on the basis that Congress had 
not waived sovereign immunity under FISA.112 In a second order, the 
district court dismissed all claims asserted by Plaintiffs on the basis of 
Reynolds state secrets privilege, including the Fourth Amendment search 
claims, which the Government did not seek dismissal of on state secrets 
grounds.113 The district court held that the subject matter of the action, 
Operation Flex, “involved intelligence that, if disclosed, would 
 
105 Fazaga. v. Federal Bureau of Investigation, 916 F.3d 1202, 1214 (9th Cir. 2019). 
106 Id. 
107 First Amended Complaint, supra note 1, at 1. 
108 Fazaga, 916 F.3d at 1214. 
109 Id. at 1214, 1235. 
110 Id. at 1214. 
111 Id. at 1214-15. The other defendants, who are all Agents of the FBI being sued in their 
official capacity, moved to dismiss claims against them on multiple grounds, including 
qualified immunity. Because those defenses present issues separate from the central issue 
in this note, they will not be discussed. 
112 Id. at 1215. 
113 Id. 
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significantly compromise national security.”114 The district court found 
that the Government Defendants would need to rely on privileged 
evidence “so inextricably tied up with nonprivileged material” that the risk 
of disclosure could not be averted through protective procedures.115 The 
district court also declined to use the in camera, ex parte procedures 
provided under §1806(f) of FISA, concluding that FISA’s procedures do 
not apply to non-FISA claims.116 
The Ninth Circuit reversed the district court’s dismissal of Plaintiffs’ 
claims on state secrets grounds.117 The court, relying on Fourth 
Amendment caselaw and paying careful attention to First Amendment 
implications, found that the plaintiffs pleaded plausible FISA claims.118 
The court held the procedures established by Congress in FISA replaced 
the dismissal remedy to common law state secrets privilege as applied to 
electronic surveillance.119 The court noted that the district court erred in 
dismissing some of the claims outright on state secrets grounds where the 
government did not assert the privilege, and on the claims in which the 
government did assert the privilege, the district court should have 
reviewed any state secrets evidence necessary for a determination of 
whether the surveillance was illegal pursuant to FISA procedures.120 In a 
ruling of first impression, the court reaffirmed the legislative intent behind 
FISA, emphasizing Congress’s aim at reigning in executive abuse of 
electronic surveillance.121 The court held that FISA’s §1806(f) procedures 
applied to affirmative constitutional challenges to unlawful surveillance or 
its use in litigation, regardless of whether the challenge is brought under 
FISA, the Constitution, or any other law.122 
V. ANALYSIS 
The Ninth Circuit in Fazaga v. FBI revived the purpose of FISA, and 
in doing so, upheld the basic constitutional principles of separation of 





117 Id. at 1254. 
118 Id. at 1253-54. The court found some of the FISA claims were not plausible because 
the Plaintiffs lacked an expectation of privacy under Fourth Amendment caselaw, and some 
of the claims were plausible but the agents were entitled to qualified immunity because the 
law was unclear. Because this note focuses on the FISA claims that were allowed to 
proceed, these holdings will not be discussed in depth. 
119 Id. at 1233-34. 
120 Id. at 1211 (emphasis added). 
121 Id. at 1225, 1233. 
122 Id. at 1238. 
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traditional—yet scrupulous—Fourth Amendment analysis, using Katz’s 
reasonable expectation of privacy test and acknowledging the implications 
of First Amendment rights in national security cases like this one. Second, 
the court properly held that the procedures established by Congress in 
FISA were intended to displace the state secrets privilege in so far as it 
called for outright dismissal of claims. 
a. The Court Justifiably Applied Careful Fourth Amendment 
Analysis 
“The right of privacy was deemed too precious to entrust to the 
discretion of those whose job is the detection of crime and the 
arrest of individuals. Power is a heady thing; and history shows 
that the police acting on their own cannot be trusted.” – 
McDonald v. US (1948) 
The Fazaga court was correct in scrupulously analyzing the Plaintiffs’ 
expectations of privacy in this context because much of the privacy 
violations took place in a religious setting and thus implicated both First 
and Fourth Amendment rights.123 After determining the complaint 
sufficiently pleaded that Plaintiffs were “aggrieved persons” as defined by 
FISA, the court then turned to whether the surveillance in Operation Flex 
constituted “electronic surveillance” within the meaning of FISA.124 The 
court explained that in order for the defendant’s electronic surveillance to 
constitute a violation under FISA, the court must find that (1) plaintiffs 
had a reasonable expectation of privacy, and (2) a warrant would be 
required for law enforcement purposes.125 
 
123 See infra Part IV.a. 
124 Fazaga, 916 F.3d at 1216, 1239. FISA provides four categories of electronic 
surveillance. See supra note 40, and accompanying text. In this case, only the fourth 
category was at issue: “the installation or use of an electronic, mechanical, or other 
surveillance device in the United States for monitoring to acquire information, other than 
from a wire or radio communication, under circumstances in which a person has a 
reasonable expectation of privacy and a warrant would be required for law enforcement 
purposes.” 50 U.S.C. § 1801(f)(4). 
125 Fazaga, 916 F.3d at 1217 (noting that the complaint alleges no warrant was obtained, 
thus court’s analysis focused on whether plaintiffs had a reasonable expectation of 
privacy). 
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i. The Reasonable Expectation of Privacy Analysis Under 
FISA is the Same as Under the Fourth Amendment 
FISA provides for criminal sanctions and civil liability where law 
enforcement undertakes electronic surveillance without a FISA warrant in 
situations where there exists a “reasonable expectation of privacy.”126 The 
court properly analyzed the statutory “reasonable expectation of privacy” 
standard analogously to the analysis under traditional law enforcement 
purposes because the origins of FISA can be traced back to executive 
branch’s unconstitutional electronic surveillance for law enforcement 
purposes.127 The decision in Katz rejected the proposition that the 
executive branch has unlimited power to conduct electronic surveillance 
for law enforcement purposes without prior judicial approval.128 The Katz 
reasonable expectation of privacy standard  has since been named the 
“touchstone of Fourth Amendment analysis.”129 The legislature followed 
the Court’s cue in Katz by creating the Wiretap Act, which allows law 
enforcement to conduct electronic surveillance only with prior judicial 
approval in the form of Title III warrants.130 
Likewise, the enactment of FISA was a reaction by Congress to 
executive abuse of power in the form of electronic surveillance in the name 
of “national security” in much the same respect as the Wiretap Act was a 
reaction the same form of executive abuse in the name of law 
enforcement.131 Insofar as FISA originates from a desire to protect the 
Fourth Amendment’s guarantee to be free from unreasonable 
governmental intrusions, the court in Fazaga correctly evaluated the 
statutory standard of “reasonable expectation of privacy” in FISA just as 
the expectation of privacy standard would be under the Fourth 
Amendment for law enforcement purposes. 
ii. Plaintiffs Expectations of Privacy are Greater in Religious 
Spaces 
In determining whether or not Plaintiffs had a reasonable expectation 
of privacy, the court exhibited a heightened level of skepticism towards 
the executive branch where Plaintiffs’ freedom of religion was also 
 
126 50 U.S.C. §§ 1801(f), 1809-10. 
127 See supra Part III and accompanying text discussing the origins of FISA as dating 
back to Olmstead and Katz. 
128 Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 359 (1967). 
129 California v. Ciraolo, 47 U.S. 207, 211-212 (1986). 
130 See Whilt, supra note 25, at 371 (“Congress enacted Title III, a statute governing 
electronic surveillance modeled after constitutional guidelines specified by the Supreme 
Court in Katz”). 
131 See Dawson, supra note 26, at 1386-87. 
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implicated.132 The court did so by separating the instances of surveillance 
where there was a religious characteristic of the surveilled activity.133 First, 
in accordance with traditional Fourth Amendment caselaw,134 the court 
held that Plaintiffs did not have a reasonable expectation of privacy for 
recordings of conversations in which Monteilh was a party, therefore no 
violation of FISA occurred.135 This is because where an undercover agent 
is an “invited informer,” Plaintiffs do not have a privacy interest in what 
is voluntary revealed to that agent.136 Nonetheless, the court found that 
under well-established Fourth Amendment caselaw, there is a reasonable 
expectation of privacy from covert recordings of conversations taking 
place in one’s home, car, office, or phone.137 Because there was evidence 
FBI agents bugged Plaintiff Fazaga’s office and Plaintiff AbdelRahim’s 
house,138 and no warrant was obtained, these recordings plausibly alleged 
a violation of FISA.139 
The court justifiably applied more careful Fourth Amendment analysis 
where the recordings took place in sacred religious spaces, such as the 
Mosque prayer halls. A reasonable expectation of privacy involves two 
inquires: first, that the person had a subjective expectation, and second, 
the expectation of privacy is one that society is prepared to accept.140 When 
First Amendment expressions of religion, especially in private places, are 
involved, there exists an unquestionable expectation of the exact privacy 
the Fourth Amendment was intended to protect.141 The expression of 
private thoughts, prayers, and confessions, relies on the ability to trust one 
is not being overheard.142 
 
132 Fazaga v. Federal Bureau of Investigation, 916 F.3d 1202, 1244 (9th Cir. 2019). 
133 Id. at 1218, 1222. 
134 Fazaga, 916. F.3d at 1219 (citing United States v. Walchumwah, 710 F.3d 862, 867 
(9th Cir. 2013) (citing the invited informer doctrine for the proposition that voluntary 
conversations with undercover informants are not protected by the Fourth Amendment 
because voluntary disclosures lack reasonable expectations of privacy); see generally Mike 
Bothwell, Facing God or the Government—United States v. Aguilar: A Big Step for Big 
Brother, 1990. BYU L. REV. 1003 (1990) (discussing the invited former doctrine and its 
impingement on First and Fourth Amendment constitutional rights). 
135 Fazaga, 916. F.3d at 1220. 
136 Id. at 1219. 
137 Id. at 1224. 
138 Id. at 1225 (including a statement by FBI agents questioning Monteilh for not 
disclosing a conversation that occurred in AbdelRahim’s house and that they knew of the 
conversation because of the recordings). 
139 Id. 
140 California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 211 (1986). 
141 See supra note 36; See also United States vs. United States Dist. Ct. (Keith), 407 U.S. 
297, 313-14 (1972). 
142 See Michael Avery, The Constitutionality of Warrantless Electronic Surveillance of 
Suspected Foreign Threats to the National Security of the United States, 62 U. MIAMI L. 
REV. 541, 597 (2008). 
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In Katz, the Supreme Court emphasized the subjective intent to be free 
of eavesdropping intruders, exhibited by shutting the door to a telephone 
booth.143 Here, the court in Fazaga found that “based on the rules and 
customs of the mosque, and the allegations in the complaint,” it had “no 
trouble determining that Plaintiffs manifested an actual, subjective 
expectation of privacy in their conversations there.”144 The court 
emphasized that the mosque was not an ordinary space—it is a place of 
worship, prayer, and fellowship.145 Moreover, the ICOI—where many 
Plaintiffs attended—specifically forbade audio or video recording in the 
mosque without permission.146 Thus, the court correctly held that Plaintiffs 
exhibited a subjective expectation of privacy in their activities within the 
mosque prayer hall. 
The court properly rejected the government’s argument that because 
Plaintiffs were not alone, their expectation of privacy was diminished.147 
As the court explained, a person is entitled to have an expectation of 
privacy in shared spaces, especially where there is a particular reason to 
expect confidentially.148  Moreover, the Supreme Court has held that 
whether a space is shared does not diminish the expectation that a person 
will not be recorded in that space.149 Mosques specifically are a place 
where trust and confidence is essential, because much of the discussion 
revolves around theology and the practice of Islam.150 The court was 
therefore correct to find that Plaintiffs had a subjective intent to express 
their religious beliefs and exchange ideas and emotions in a safe space, 
free from government observation. 
After finding that Plaintiffs exhibited a subjective expectation of 
privacy, the court correctly determined that Plaintiffs had an expectation 
of privacy that society was prepared to recognize as reasonable.151 The 
court highlighted that context is key to this inquiry, and thus emphasis 
should be placed on the nature of the place where the recordings were 
made.152 Here, the mosque prayer hall is a sacred and intimate place that 
 
143 See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 352 (“[A] person in a telephone booth may 
rely upon the protection of the Fourth Amendment. One who occupies it . . . is surely 
entitled to assume that the words he utters into the mouthpiece will not be broadcast to the 
world.”). 
144 Fazaga v. Federal Bureau of Investigation, 916 F.3d 1202, 1220 (9th Cir. 2019). 
145 Id. at 1220. 
146 Id. at 1221. 
147 Id. 
148 Id. 
149 Id. at 1221-22 (citing Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2219 (2018)). 
150 Fazaga, 916 F.3d at 1221. 
151 Id. at 1223. 
152 Id. at 1222. 
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is distinguishable from typical public spaces.153 The court accurately 
emphasized the location of the Mosque prayer hall, because the Fourth 
Amendment requires that sight is not lost of the place in which a person 
expects privacy.154 For example, the Framers designed the warrant clause 
of the Fourth Amendment to require particularity with respect to the place 
to be searched in order to protect private spaces and permit searches only 
where evidence of a crime may be found.155 The Constitution’s intentional 
limitations on law enforcement’s ability to search particular spaces 
without a warrant confirms that some spaces are objectively more private 
than others.156 The court skillfully contrasted the sacred nature of the 
mosque prayer hall with public spaces where society accepts a diminished 
sense of privacy, finding that the judiciary’s “constitutional protection of 
religious observance” supports finding a reasonable expectation of privacy 
in the mosque prayer hall where privacy concerns are recognized and 
protected.157 
Finally, the court underscored the First Amendment implications of 
the mosque prayer hall on Fourth Amendment expectations of privacy.158 
Relying on Supreme Court caselaw, the court explained that when the 
surveillance is aimed at content protected by the First Amendment, “the 
Fourth Amendment must be applied with ‘scrupulous exactitude.’”159 True 
enjoyment of First Amendment freedoms cannot take place without Fourth 
Amendment protections—the growth of self, the finding of theological 
values, and even reflections of political dissent rely on the ability to trust 
one will be left alone.160 Particularly for Muslims, prayer is a pillar of 
religion: it is a necessary and profound ritual that requires individual 
devotion and expungement of the outside world.161 This sacred religious 
 
153 Id. 
154 See Avery, supra note 141, at 596-97. 
155 Id.; U.S. CONST. amend. IV. (“No Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, 
supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and 
the persons or things to be seized.”) 
156 Another example is the home. Although there are many exceptions to the warrant 
requirement in public spaces, such as exigent circumstances, the Supreme Court has 
repeatedly found that searches and seizures inside of a home are assumed to be 
unreasonable. See. e.g., Brigham City, Utah v. Stuart, 126 S. Ct. 1943, 1947 (2006). 
157 Fazaga. v. Federal Bureau of Investigation, 916 F.3d 1202, 1223 (9th Cir. 2019). 
158 Id. 
159 Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
160 See Avery, supra note 141, at 588; see also Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 478 
(1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting) (arguing that the Framers of the Constitution, in writing 
the Fourth Amendment, “conferred, as against the government, the right to be let alone–
the most comprehensive of rights and the right most valued by civilized men.”). 
161 See The Five Pillars of Islam, METRO. MUSEUM OF ART, 
https://www.metmuseum.org/learn/educators/curriculum-resources/art-of-the-islamic-
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practice, therefore, cannot exist without the ability to be free of unwanted 
observations.162 The court recognized the prayers and religious activities 
that Operation Flex targeted were of the kind of activities that the Fourth 
Amendment was drafted, in part, to protect and must be considered 
reasonable.163 
The Supreme Court has long recognized that national security cases 
comprise an extraordinary merging of First and Fourth amendment 
values.164 Given that the Supreme Court has already rejected the 
executive’s use of warrantless surveillance in domestic security cases, 
finding that “unreviewed executive discretion” may too readily “overlook 
potential invasions of privacy and protected speech,”165 it was only 
suitable for the court in Fazaga to recognize these same Fourth and First 
Amendment concerns also exist in foreign security cases. This is 
especially true following the 9/11 attacks, in which time there has been a 
rise in abridgments of First Amendment rights of Muslims in America.166 
Here, where Plaintiffs were targeted on the sole basis of their religious 
associations, the court was right to recognize that Fourth Amendment 
protections become “more necessary when the targets of official 
surveillance may be those suspected of unorthodoxy.”167 After all, FISA 
itself serves as congressional recognition that Fourth Amendment rights 
must not be abridged on the basis of First Amendment protected freedoms, 
such as religious expression.168 Accordingly, the court was justified in 
concluding that society recognizes an expectation of privacy, perhaps 
worthy of even greater Fourth Amendment protections, where freedom of 
religious expression is at stake.169 
 
world/unit-one/the-five-pillars-of-islam; see also Worship, BBC, 
https://www.bbc.co.uk/bitesize/guides/z94dtfr/revision/1. 
162 See Avery, supra note 141, at 597. 
163 Id. at 596-97. 
164 United States v. United States Dist. Ct. (Keith), 407 U.S. 297, 313 (1972). 
165 Id. at 317 (emphasis added). 
166 See generally Illusions of Justice, supra note 7. 
167 United States v. United States Dist. Ct. (Keith), 407 U.S. at 314. 
168 See S. REP. NO. 95-604(I), 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3904, 3908 (“The exercise of political 
freedom depends in large measure on citizen’ understanding that they will be able to be 
publicly active and dissent from official policy . . . without having to sacrifice the 
expectation of privacy that they rightfully hold.”). 
169 Fazaga v. Federal Bureau of Investigation, 916 F.3d 1202, 1224 (9th Cir. 2019) 
(concluding that although the plaintiffs had a reasonable expectation of privacy in their 
conversations within the Mosque prayer halls, the law was unclear in the area and so the 
FBI Agent Defendants were entitled to qualified immunity for this category of recordings). 
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b. The Court Reinforced Separation of Powers Principles in 
Holding FISA Procedures Overruled the State Secrets Dismissal 
Remedy 
In holding that Plaintiffs’ claims could proceed through the tailored 
procedures Congress established in FISA, the court upheld basic principles 
of constitutional separation of powers and checks and balances. The court 
emphasized the legislative intent behind FISA: to provide a check on the 
executive’s abusive use of electronic surveillance in the name of national 
security.170 In doing so, the court accomplished three very important aims. 
First, the court prevented the executive branch from transforming the 
Reynolds evidentiary privilege into a broad claim of executive immunity. 
Second, the court confirmed Congress’s intent to delegate to the judiciary 
branch a role in checking on the executive branch’s encroachment on civil 
liberties under the guise of national security. Finally, the court fulfilled its 
constitutional duty to oversee executive action where an individual alleges 
abuse of authority, unconstitutional conduct, or violation of a statute. 
i. The Court Correctly Affirmed that Reynolds is a Rule of 
Evidence, Not a Constitutional Construction for Unitary 
Executive Power 
As the court explained, the Reynolds privilege is an evidentiary rule 
evolved through common-law, it is not a constitutional instrument for the 
executive to claim unchecked, arbitrary power.171 The state secrets 
privilege, if left unbound, has the ability to shield the executive from 
accountability, public scrutiny, and potential civil liability by removing 
judicial review and preventing abuses of power from coming to light 
through litigation.172 Moreover, the privilege has the power to turn a 
limited evidentiary rule into a constitutional claim of unitary executive 
power over any and all claims pertaining to national security.173 Where the 
privilege is used to outright dismiss cases—especially at the pleading stage 
before discovery—the executive immediately insulates himself from 
judicial and public scrutiny, over time transforming the privilege into a 
tool for concentrating power in one branch.174 
Ironically, the devastating consequences of the state secrets privilege 
on constitutional guarantees are exactly why it was necessary for the court 
to pronounce that the state secrets privilege is not a rule of constitutional 
 
170 Id. at 1233. 
171 Id. at 1231. 
172 See Fichera, supra note 72, at 627. 
173 See Frost, supra note 75, at 1932; see also Fichera, supra note 72, at 640. 
174 See Chesney, supra note 74, at 1269. 
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construction—it is a rule of evidence.175 By reciting the common-law 
origins of the privilege and the limited situations in which the Reynolds 
privilege may serve to dismiss a case, the court rejected the executive’s 
claim that the privilege may act as unbound deference through which 
executive defendants may insulate themselves.176 Indeed the Reynolds 
court itself recognized the court’s gatekeeping function for the state’s 
privileged evidence, instructing the court to determine itself whether the 
claim of privilege was appropriate under the circumstances, while being 
careful not to disclose national security secrets. As the Fazaga court noted, 
however, a mere cry of military secrets, counterterrorism, or national 
security by the executive is not sufficient to support a finding that the 
evidence is privileged. Instead, courts should continue to act as the 
gatekeepers of evidence, even where state secrets are at stake, to avoid 
being over deferential to the executive and disrupting separation of powers 
principles.177 Finally, by confining the state secrets privilege, and the 
Reynolds rule in particular, to a common law rule of evidence rather than 
constitutional construction, the court gave constitutional support to 
Congress’s ability to overrule state secrets through the legislation of 
FISA.178 
After the court reiterated the common-law nature of the state secrets 
privilege and confirmed Congress’s ability to legislate over the 
privilege,179 the court’s holding confirmed Congress’s intent to make 
§1806(f) of FISA the exclusive means for evaluating evidence that 
potentially threatens national security in determining the legality of 
electronic surveillance.180 The court explained that the procedures in 
§1806(f) arise from the same concern as the state secrets privilege—
disclosure of evidence that threatens national security—and that §1806(f) 
 
175 Fazaga v. Federal Bureau of Investigation, 916 F.3d 1202, 1231 (9th Cir. 2019). 
176 Id. at 1227. 
177 See Fisher, supra note 74, at 258 (“Broad deference by the courts to the executive 
branch, allowing an official to determine what documents are privileged, undermines the 
judiciary’s duty to assure fairness in the courtroom and to decide what evidence may be 
introduced.”). For a further discussion of the Judiciary Branch’s constitutional duties, see 
infra part V.B.iii. 
178 Fazaga, 916 F.3d. at 1231-32. 
179 The court briefly noted that a clear statement by Congress that it was overruling a 
common law rule is not required, only that the legislation “speaks directly to the question” 
otherwise answered by federal common law is required. Here, the court found the 
procedures in 1806(f) of FISA spoke directly to the dismissal remedy otherwise available 
under common law state secrets privilege. Id. at 1231. 
180 § 1806(f) provides that where a motion is made to suppress evidence relating to 
electronic surveillance on the grounds that disclosure would harm national security, the 
district court hearing the motion should review in camera and ex parte the evidence to 
determine whether the surveillance was lawfully authorized and conducted. 50 U.S.C. 
§ 1806(f); see also Fazaga, 926 F.3d at 1231. 
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is triggered in a nearly identical process to the formal assertion triggering 
state secrets privilege.181 As such, the court concluded that §1806(f) 
codified the state secrets privilege with respect to consideration of 
electronic state secrets evidence, directing in camera and ex parte review 
of the relevant evidence in place of the common law dismissal remedy.182 
By ruling FISA procedures to eliminate the need for Reynolds dismissal 
remedy, the court reduces the executive’s ability to insulate himself from 
scrutiny by claiming broad governmental immunity. 
ii. The Court Accepted Congress’s Invitation to Provide a 
Constitutionally Granted Joint Check on the President 
The court found that the legislative intent behind FISA supports the 
conclusion that Congress intended to give the courts a role in regulating 
foreign intelligence surveillance.183 FISA was a response to the 
executive’s abusive surveillance practices in the name of national security, 
which lead to violations of constitutional rights of citizens “primarily 
because checks and balances designed by the Framers of the Constitution 
to assure accountability [were not] applied.”184 The court aptly highlighted 
that FISA strikes a balance by enlisting both Congress and the courts in 
the oversight of surveillance activities by the executive branch while 
providing measures to safeguard national security.185 The court noted that 
Congress considered the limitations placed on the courts under the 
common law states secrets privilege, and intentionally recruited the courts 
in protecting against electronic surveillance by enacting FISA.186 
The court’s endorsement of FISA’s careful system of checks on broad 
executive claims of state secrets reaffirmed the Framers’ will that each 
branch of government shall play a role in checking on the others, so that 
 
181 Fazaga, 916 F.3d at 1232. 
182 Id. at 1231-32. 
183 Id. at 1232. 
184 Id. at 1233 (citing S. REP. NO. 94-755, at 289 (1976). 
185 Id. at 1232 (citing In re NSA Telecomms. Records Litig., 564. F. Supp. 2d 1109, 1119 
(N.D. Cal. 2013)); see also Ira S. Shapiro, The Foreign Intelligence Act: Legislative 
Balancing of National Security and the Fourth Amendment, 15 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 119, 
204 (“In place of the lawlessness of the past, [FISA] offers a system of internal executive 
accountability, a meaningful, antecedent role for the courts, consistent with the Fourth 
Amendment . . . “). 
186 Fazaga, 916 F.3d at 1233-34. See Frost, supra note 75, at 1957 (“Congress’s 
deliberate use of the courts as a check on abuse of executive power should be a factor in 
the court’s analysis of the state secrets privilege. Courts should always be cautious when 
faced with executive assertion of the privilege, but they should be especially reluctant to 
dismiss entire categories of challenges to executive actions that Congress intended them to 
hear.”). 
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no one branch usurps power from the other branches.187 The Framers 
feared the abuse of executive power most, which is why the separation of 
powers acts as a failsafe by allowing Congress to enjoin the court in 
checking on the executive’s actions.188 Congress is empowered to delegate 
when the courts should provide a check on the executive by granting them 
jurisdiction to hear a variety of cases.189 When courts acquiesce to the 
executive’s attempt to dismiss cases on the grounds that evidence is 
protected by state secrets privilege, the court undermines Congress’s 
attempt to cooperate with the courts, leaves the executive unchecked by 
any branch, and jeopardizes civil liberties.190 
The Ninth Circuit in Fazaga simply applied these principles to find 
that Congress intended FISA to delegate to the courts authority to check 
the executive where claims of unconstitutional surveillance arise.191 In 
doing so, the court accepted the legislature’s offer to join forces in keeping 
the executive’s surveillance practices in line with the constitution. The 
court’s claim of authority is significant because the alliance between the 
legislative and judicial branch becomes all the more important where, as 
here, the civil liberties at stake are plenty and depend on the constitutional 
guarantee of checks and balances.192 
iii. The Court Fulfilled the Constitutional Duties of the 
Judiciary Branch 
The court in Fazaga executed its constitutional duty to oversee claims 
of illegal executive action and provide redress where constitutional rights 
are violated.193 The executive often uses the claim of privilege to strip 
 
187 See also Erwin Chemerinsky, The Assault on the Constitution: Executive Power and 
the War on Terrorism, 40 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1, 16-17 (2006) (stating checking executive 
power is “a central goal of the American constitution. [ . . . ] [t]he Framers of the 
Constitution feared executive power the most [and therefore] viewed the principle of 
separation of powers as the central guarantee of a just government.”). 
188 Id.; see Frost, supra note 75, at 1933. 
189 See Frost, supra note 75, at 1951, 1932 n.5 (noting that 28 U.S.C. § 1331 grants courts 
jurisdiction to hear all civil actions “arising under” federal law). 
190 See Frost, supra note 75, at 1933; see also Fisher, supra note 74, at 262 (“The Framers 
adopted separation of powers and checks and balances because they did not trust human 
nature and feared concentrated power. To defer to agency claims about privileged 
documents and state secrets is to abandon the independence that the Constitution vests in 
Congress and the courts, placing in jeopardy the individual liberties that depend on 
institutional checks.”). 
191 Fazaga, 916 F.3d at 1231. 
192 See Fichera, supra note 72, at 641. 
193 “[I]t is the federal courts’ role to restrain and remedy unconstitutional government 
conduct, and separation of powers is enhanced, not infringed, when the judiciary hears and 
decides constitutional cases.” Erwin Chemerinsky, FEDERAL JURISDICTION 34-35 (4th ed. 
2003). 
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judicial power to oversee executive action.194 Were the courts to give the 
executive broad, unquestioned deference in determining what evidence 
contains state secrets and therefore must be privileged, there will be no 
role left for the judiciary to oversee fairness in litigation and determine 
what evidence may be introduced.195 As one constitutional scholar has put 
it, if the judicial branch “rarely if ever actually reject[s] an assertion of the 
privilege, a perception may arise within the executive branch . . . that 
judicial review has no true bite . . . .”196 Fazaga therefore put the “bite” 
back in judicial review by confirming the courts’ jurisdiction to hear cases 
challenging the constitutionality of foreign intelligence surveillance. 
Finally, by not being overly deferential to the executive branch’s claim of 
state secrets, the court faithfully effected its constitutional duties to uphold 
the laws of the land and provide redress where individual rights are 
abridged. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
Technology has given the individual great freedom to relax by solving 
much of life’s inconveniences. At the same time, technology has put civil 
liberties at great risk in a world where tiny recording devices can be found 
and obtained with a quick search on Amazon.197 Today, in the wake of the 
Edward Snowden leaks, the sale of consumer information by social 
networks, and dragnet FBI surveillance, it is clear the consequences our 
precious electronics may have on our right to privacy have only grown 
since the enactment of FISA. If Americans are to retain any meaningful 
right to privacy, and corollary right to freedom of expression within that 
realm of privacy, checks and balances must remain in place to prevent 
repetitive executive abuse of power. The Ninth Circuit’s use of FISA as a 
tool of separation of powers reflects a courageous willingness of the 
judicial branch to engage in checking executive function where core civil 
liberties are at stake. While cries of national security threats are often used 
to incite fear, America would do well to keep a watchful eye on the biggest 
threat to our civilized democracy—an unbound executive chipping away 
at civil liberty. 
 
 
194 See Frost, supra note 75, at 1956-67. 
195 Id. at 1950-51. 
196 See Chesney, supra note 74, at 1311. 
197 Search results for “small recording device,” AMAZON.COM, https://www.amazon.com 
(search in search bar for “small recording device”). 
